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GETTING THE MOST AND GIVING THE LEAST FROM VIRGINIA'S
"MENTAL MITIGATION EXPERT" STATUTE
BY: HELEN L. KONRAD
When planning the trial strategy for a capital murder case, a
mental health expert's assistance can be invaluable. At the same time,
it can create unforeseen problems. This paper initially will present the
various methods of obtaining mental health expert assistance and will
then compare the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The
focus, however, will be to decipher Virginia's statutory provision for
providing mental health expert assistance, and to explain how the
statute works in practice.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause requires that indigent defendants be provided the "raw mate-
rials" and "basic tools" necessary to marshall their defense. InAke v.
Oklahoma, the Court more specifically held that the right to a mental
health expert is such a "basic tool" and it attaches once the indigent
defendant shows that insanity will be a significant factor in his
defense.I The rationale of Ake has been extended beyond cases where
sanity is at issue. In a capital case, use of a mental health expert can
be a "basic tool" in the presentation of mitigation evidence at the
penalty phase of the trial.
Ake's progeny, however, holds that before the right to the expert
attaches, the defendant must make a detailed and persuasive showing
that the expert is necessary and that the defendant would not receive
a fair trial without the assistance of the expert.2 At present no court
has explicitly formulated a checklist of what must be included in an
Ake motion to meet this detailed and persuasive showing. Nonethe-




Name, qualifications, fees etc. of the expert.
Reasonableness of the cost.
Objective bases for the request.
Subjective bases for the request.
Legal necessity.
Legal entitlement to defense experts.
Inadequacy of available state experts.
Supporting information for all of these factors. 3
The advantages of seeking expert assistance underAke are really
twofold: first, that the attorney is forced to develop a theory of
mitigation almost as a condition of receiving the appointment of the
expert, and second, that once appointed, the expert operates as a
"defense consultant," assisting in the preparation and presentation of
the defendant's case.
The disadvantages are first, that despite the constitutional basis
for the right, no specific showing can ensure appointment of the
expert. Second, this amorphous, yet "basic tool" showing, also must
be heavily substantiated. Finally, Ake does not give the defendant the
right to an expert of the defendant's choosing or even to get the funds
to hire an expert of the defendant's choosing.
Unlike the detailed showing required to receive expert assistance
under Ake, Virginia's three statutory entitlements to receive assis-
tance are less stringent. A capital defendant may receive a competency
evaluation, but only to ensure that the defendant has the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his
own defense. 4 A capital defendant may also receive a sanity evalu-
ation, but that inquiry is limited to the defendant's sanity at the time
of the offense, and only as it is relevant to the presentation of an
insanity defense.
5
Virginia's third statutory entitlement (3: 1), and the most important
one for a capital defendant, is especially attractive because it auto-
matically provides expert assistance to a defendant merely if (1) he is
charged with or convicted of capital murder, and (2) he is indigent. 6
This easy access is both enhanced and undermined by many specific
provisions of the statute requiring a more detailed inquiry.
As stated above, an indigent defendant charged with or convicted
of capital murder necessitates that the "court appoint one or more
qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to assist
the defense in the preparation and presentation of information con-
cerning the defendant's history, character, or mental condition.1
7
This disjunctive language permits a situation where the indigent
defendant is charged with capital murder and petitions the court for a
mental health expert. Once the defendant is convicted of capital
murder, the attorney moves the court again for another mental health
expert on a different issue concerning the defendant's history, char-
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acter, or mental condition. Although Ake also provides for multiple
experts, a distinct detailed showing would be required for each
request. Therefore, recourse to multiple experts through 3:1 would be
much more expedient.
In addition to determining when a defendant can obtain expert
assistance, the statute specifies the topics discoverable through expert
assistance. The first two permissible areas of inquiry are the existence
or absence of statutory mitigating factors. 8 The remaining inquiry is
a more general license to determine the existence or absence of other
mitigating factors outside of the statute. 9
Similar to the pre-trial determination of a mitigation theory
necessary to present an adequate Ake motion, effective use of 3:1
requires that the attorney investigate and formulate a theory of
mitigation and discuss it with the expert p.2t to the actual evaluation.
For example, the defense attorney should tell the evaluator if she
suspects that the defendant was abused as a child (under Ake, #6
subjective bases), or if the defendant often exhibits improper affect
(under Ake, #5 objective bases).
When the evaluation is completed, but before any written report
is prepared, the attorney should again discuss with the expert the
viability of the mitigation theory posited, as well as any specific
results obtained. This oral discussion is also necessary so that the
attorney may reinvestigate any open issues, and more accurately
assess whether or not the expert should be called to testify at all in the
defendant's trial. Assuming the expert should be called, the attorney
must adequately prepare the expert beyond these initial conversations.
Whether or not the expert testifies, the statute requires that the
expert prepare and submit a report to the defendant's attorney.'
0
However, given the Commonwealth's potential to discover the report
if the expert is called to testify, the report should be carefully drafted.
The statute specifically provides that the report include:
the expert's opinion as to (i) whether the defendant acted
under extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time
of the offense, (ii) whether the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly
impaired, and (iii) whether there are any other factors in
mitigation relating to the history or character of the defen-
dant or the defendant's mental condition at the time of the
offense. I
The first two elements require a conclusion about the existence
or absence of statutory mitigating factors. Similarly, the third re-
quirement necessitates a conclusion about the existence or absence of
"other factors" relating to the defendant. However, the language of
the third requirement does not insist on an elaboration of those other
factors -just whether or not any exist. Therefore, this prong can be
satisfied completely by a yes or no response. Any specification of
what these factors are and how they manifest themselves should only
be relayed to the defense attorney orally.
The phrasing of the written report is crucial because the statute
requires that the report, and any other evaluations of the defendant's
mental condition, be turned over to the Commonwealth if the
defendant's attorney notifies the Commonwealth that she intends to
"present psychiatric and psychological evidence in mitigation pursuant
to subsection E."12 Because of the broad discovery implications of
this provision, several important points are worth noting.
First, if the defense intended to call a mental health expert
secured under Ake and not under Virginia's 3:1 entitlement, then the
defense would still have to notify the Commonwealth, as provided in
subsection E. However, the defense would not have to turn over the
report generated following the Ake evaluation as part of the "other
evaluations" because the statute only contemplates complete disclo-
sure when a 3:1 report exists in addition to other evaluations.
Similarly, the disclosure requirement only applies if the defense
intends to present mental health expert testimony, as contemplated by
subsection E of the statute. In other words, if the defense intends to
present lay mental health testimony or no testimony at all, just
presentation of various records, then the Commonwealth does not
need to be notified nor do the reports and evaluations need to be
disclosed.
Finally, the statute provides that the disclosure take place after
the defense gives the Commonwealth notice of its intent. However,
the statute is ambiguous as to how long "after." Because the statute
does not say that the disclosure should take place contemporaneously
with the notice, the defense attorney should never be compelled to do
so. In fact, fairness should compel the attorney to retain any and all
reports to be disclosed until the Commonwealth provides discovery
that it is constitutionally obligated to disclose, but not required to
disclose under any specific time frame.
Beyond acting as a triggering device for the disclosure of reports,
the notice provision itself is fraught with problems. The statute
expressly states that the notification must occur when the defense
"intends, in the event of conviction, to present testimony of an expert
witness to support a claim in mitigation."'13 A tenable argument is that
the notce of intent, and therefore the disclosure, is required only when
the deferlant is in fact convicted of capital murder. The actual intent
to present expert testimony in the penalty trial might not be defini-
tively decided at an earlier time.
The statute is internally inconsistent, however, because it goes on
to specify that this notice of intent should take place "at least twenty-
one days before trial," when defense may have no idea whether or not
she will present expert testimony at the penalty phase of the trial.
14
Further, if the defense does not provide notice within this time frame,
the defense may be precluded from offering the expert testimony. The
most rational reading of this inconsistency is that "trial" refers to the
penalty trial and not the guilt phase of the capital murder trial. If
subsection A can be read that a defense attorney could request a
second expert after a conviction, then subsection E could be read that
the notice would be provided to the Commonwealth at the time of that
second request, with at least a twenty-one day continuance before the
penalty trial actually began.
However, if the appointment of a second expert did not occur and
the penalty phase immediately followed the conviction, then the
requirement to provide notice or risk preclusion of evidence is not
constitutionally sound, assuming that the defense has not yet decided
whether or not it intends to call the expert. Two United States
Supreme Court cases support this proposition. In Williams v. Florida
the Court upheld a Florida statute requiring the defense to disclose
ahead of trial alibi witnesses that it intended to call.1 5 Because the
defense had never denied that they intended to call those witnesses,
the Court reasoned that such a statute does not compel disclosure, it
merely accelerates the timing of this disclosure.16
Conversely, the United States Supreme Court in Brooks v.
Tennessee struck down a state rule requiring that a criminal defendant
"desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony for the
defense is heard by the court trying the case." 17 The Court determined
that the rule was ".... an impermissible restriction on the defendant's
right against self-incrimination, 'to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty.., for such silence."' 18
The two cases are not inconsistent because Williams permits pre-
trial discovery, as long as the defense has solidified its intentions and
notifying the prosecution will merely accelerate the prosecution's
access to that information. On the other hand, as in Brooks, requiring
the defendant to testify first or risk forfeiting his right to do so compels
the defense to assess the value of the defendant's testimony before
defense counsel adequately can determine whether that testimony is
really necessary.
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Therefore, 3: 1's requirement to disclose twenty-one days before
trial, an intention to call an expert to testify in the penalty trial is only
enforceable if the defense counsel's intentions are in fact certain. If
they are not, the defense cannot be compelled to assess the value of the
expert's testimony before the moment in which the expert will be
called. More accurately in the context of a capital case, a state may not
compel a defendant to surrender sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendment rights if he wants to assert his Fifth Amendment rights. 19
Virginia's 3:1 does not only threaten preclusion of defense
evidence for failing to notify the Commonwealth of an intention to use
expert testimony, 3:1 also threatens preclusion of defense expert
testimony if the defendant does not cooperate with an independent
Commonwealth's expert evaluation of the defendant, as provided in
subsection F.20 The defense should ensure that the Commonwealth's
evaluation is in fact independent by refraining from disclosing any of
the defense reports required by subsections C and D until after the
Commonwealth's evaluation has taken place.
Second, the statute limits the scope of this independent exami-
nation to the "existence or absence of mitigating circumstances
relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense."
21
By definition, then, the evaluation cannot include inquiry into future
dangerousness. In addition, the defendant should be warned that the
Commonwealth's expert is not permitted to go into issues of unrelated
acts or crimes.
This warning is especially important because subsection G
precludes the Commonwealth's use of any of defendant's statements,
or evidence derived from the defendant's statements or disclosures, in
its case-in-chief. "Such statements or disclosures shall be admissible
in rebuttal only when relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the
defense."'22 As a practical matter, before the Commonwealth makes
any use at the penalty trial of information gained through 3:1, defense
counsel should request a side-bar and verify exactly what issues in
mitigation have been raised by the defense as a means of narrowing
what the Commonwealth may rebut.
Although 3: 1's initial qualifying requirements are not difficult to
meet, as compared to an Ake request, the subsequent statutory re-
quirements expose the defense case in mitigation to some pretrial
discovery by the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the assistance pro-
vided in 3:1, properly utilized, may be crucial for a capital defendant
and defense attorneys should not be scared away by its potential
pitfalls. Rather, a structured strategy should be undertaken to give the
Commonwealth no more than the statute clearly requires and the
Constitution permits. The Commonwealth can only move beyond the
bounds of the statute, as this article has described, if defense attorneys
permit it.
1Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
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STATUS OF SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
HELPFUL TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
BY: STEVEN K. HERNDON
GINGER M. JONAS
The purpose of this article is to assist capital defense counsel in
their preparation for future cases by identifying and assessing the
current status of Supreme Court cases that have been particularly
helpful to capital defendants. First, some of the most useful Supreme
Court cases will be highlighted. Against this background, decisions
which suggest a retreat by the Court will be evaluated.
In its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 the United States
Supreme Court held that all death penalty statutes, as applied, were
unconstitutional because they failed to guide the sentencer's discre-
tion.2 In 1976, the Supreme Court struck down North Carolina and
Louisiana statutes containing mandatory death sentence provisions,
but upheld Georgia, Florida, and Texas death penalty statutes that
sufficiently guided the sentencer's discretion.
3
The 1976 decisions outlined the fundamental eighth amendment
requirements that death penalty statutes must comply with in order to
pass constitutional scrutiny. The constitutionally required elements
are that a statute must narrow the class of death eligible defendants,
and guide the jury's discretion to ensure an individualized determina-
tion on the appropriateness of the death sentence. 4 Since 1976, the
Court has further defined these principles, and subsequently established
the present constitutional boundaries of these fundamental eighth
amendment requirements.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
I. Vague Statutory Aggravating Factors:
One of the approved means to guide jury discretion is to allow the
sentencer to consider certain factors that aggravate a homicide,
thereby setting it apart from an ordinary murder.5 However, some of
the general statutory terms employed for this purpose may be con-
stitutionally deficient.
In Godfrey v. Georgia,6 the Supreme Court held that a Georgia
trial court's application of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating
